“The Danish government has used fear of Russia's brutal war to rush through major policy changes”

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an unacceptable violation of international law, posing serious questions about how best to respond. In a climate of increasing tension and militarisation, is it possible to oppose Putin’s aggression while maintaining a perspective of peace and disarmament?

The Danish government is also using the crisis in Ukraine to further deepen military with the US and to remove the country’s exemption from participation in EU security and defence operations.

Denmark’s left-wing party, the Red-Green Alliance, recently held its annual conference, where its perspectives on NATO and the EU were fiercely debated. Nonetheless, Christine Lundgaard insists, the Red-Green Alliance maintains its commitment to peace, disarmament and an end to all imperialist wars.

Duroyan Fertl interviewed her about Denmark’s position on the war, the push for greater militarisation and the expected consequences.

How has the Danish government responded to the war in Ukraine?

The Danish government has used Russia's brutal war and the fear it has created as a kind of “shock doctrine”, to rush through major policy changes – otherwise difficult to argue for in the political debate – under cover of a huge crisis. This applies to armaments and militarisation at both a national and EU level, and in NATO. It is about welding Denmark even closer together with the United States in security policy. And it applies to a narrowing focus on the military as a counter to threats to our security.

This sounds like a substantial shift in position.

In the midst of the heated Ukraine crisis, on February 10, the Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced that the government was in concrete negotiations with the United States on a new defence cooperation, involving American troops on Danish soil. According to her, the initiative was not directly related to the crisis in Ukraine, but no one doubts that the crisis is being used as an excuse for a political move which in Denmark is deeply controversial.

It is a change to Danish security policy of the last 70 years, where we have not allowed foreign powers to deploy troops and military equipment, and in particular not nuclear weapons, on Danish soil.

We should not forget though that it is part of history that Danish governments have had secret agreements with the US government not to inform Denmark about the possible placement of nuclear weapons in Greenland, against this official Danish policy. So the experience is that agreements with the United States on deployments can also apply to nuclear weapons without the people being told.

Read the full article at Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung - Brussels Office.

„Die wichtigste Folge in Finnland ist die Frage der NATO-Mitgliedschaft“

Russlands völkerrechtswidriger Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine führt zu neuen Diskussionen über den Umgang mit Russland. So sind Finnland und Schweden näher denn je an einem NATO-Beitritt. Würde Finnland der NATO beitreten, würde sich die Landgrenze des westlichen Militärbündnisses zu Russland verdoppeln.

Die wichtigste Konsequenz aus dem Russland-Ukraine-Krieg sei in Finnland die Frage der NATO-Mitgliedschaft, sagt Pinja Vuorinen, Vorsitzende der Linksjugend Finnlands.

Duroyan Fertl befragte sie zu Finnlands Haltung zum Krieg und den zu erwarteten Folgen für Finnland.

Wie reagiert die finnische Regierung auf den Krieg in der Ukraine? Hat er einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Haltung? Welche Maßnahmen plant die Regierung, um den Frieden in der Ukraine herzustellen?

Die finnische Regierung hat auf den Krieg in der Ukraine gemeinschaftlich reagiert, alle Parteien in der Mitte-Links-Koalitionsregierung verurteilen den Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine. Die ersten und wichtigsten von der Regierung eingeleiteten Schritte in Bezug auf die Situation waren Sanktionen gegen Russland, sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf EU-Ebene. Die generelle Einstellung war die Mitverfolgung der Situation, da die Schwere der Angriffe weiterhin schwankt.

Alles in allem war der Angriff für Finnland sowie für ganz Europa ein ziemlicher Schock, wobei die Reaktionen von der Forderung nach überlegten Erwiderungen bis hin zu heftigen Forderungen nach Militäraktionen reichten. Es ist klar, dass als Nachbar Russlands die Sorge über mögliche Sicherheitsrisiken, denen Finnland ausgesetzt sein könnte, zunimmt.

Bis jetzt bestand die Position der Regierung darin, die Ukraine sowie ihre Bevölkerung materiell zu unterstützen, indem sie den Menschen wie andere EU-Länder vorübergehende Zuflucht gewährt. Sie hat auch zu Friedensverhandlungen aufgerufen, und der Präsident Finnlands hat sowohl mit US-Präsidenten Biden als auch mit dem russischen Präsidenten Putin Kontakt aufgenommen.

Lesen Sie den vollständigen Artikel auf der Website der Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung - Büro Brüssel.

“The most significant consequence in Finland has been the question of NATO membership”

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine grossly violates international law and thus leads to new discussions on how to deal with Russia. As a result, Finland and Sweden are closer than ever to join NATO. If Finland were to join NATO, the Western military alliance's land border with Russia would double.

The most significant consequence in Finland regarding the Russia-Ukraine war has been the question of NATO membership, says Pinja Vuorinen, Chair of the Left Youth of Finland.

Duroyan Fertl interviewed her about Finland’s position on the war and the expected consequences for Finland.

What is the Finnish government’s reaction to the war in Ukraine? Are there any significant changes in position? What measures does the government intend to take to establish peace in Ukraine?

The Finnish government has reacted to the war in Ukraine in a unified manner, with all the parties in the centre-left coalition government condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine. The most important step the government has taken in response to the situation has been to push for sanctions on Russia at both the national and EU levels. Generally, the attitude has been to take stock of the situation as the severity of the attack continues to fluctuate.

All in all, the attack has been quite a shock to Finland as it has been to Europe as a whole, with some calling for cool-headed reactions and others making much more heated demands for military action. Being a neighbour of Russia, it is understandable that Finland is particularly worried about the possible security risks the country might face.

So far, the government’s response has been to support Ukraine materially and to provide humanitarian support by offering temporary refuge to its people, as other EU countries have done. It has also called for peace negotiations, and the president of Finland has been in touch with both the US president Biden as well as the Russian president Putin.

Read the full article at Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung - Brussels Office.

Brexit-aren ondoren: Irlanda, Eskozia eta EB

Britainia Handiak 2020ko urtarrilaren 31n Europako Batasuna formalki utzi zuenean, bere aldekoek ospatu zuten “subiranotasun britainiarra” berrezarri zela, baina Brexitak bultzada berri bat eman dio estatu britainiarraren desintegrazioari, Eskoziaren independentziari eta Irlandaren batasunari emandako babesa handituz. EBk, oro har, begiko ditu asmo horiek, baina neurri handi batean pasiboa izan da, haustura politikoarekiko duen higuina dela eta. Baliteke jarrera hori aldatu behar izatea.

Irlandako mugak zailtasun larriak eragin ditu Brexit-aren negoziazioetan eta ordutik hona. EBren muga porotsu berri batek, gatazka osteko eremu batean, merkatu bakarra eta EBko aduana-batasuna mehatxatzen zituen, eta irudimenezko konponbideak eskatzen zituen. Azken erantzunak, Brexita Erretiratzeko Akordioaren “Irlanda/Ipar Irlandari buruzko Protokoloak”, eszenatoki bat negoziatu zuen “bi munduetako onena” jasoz: merkatu bakarra, eskualde-ekonomia, jurisdikzio britainiarra eta 1998ko Ostiral Santuko Akordioan ezarritako eskubideak babestea.

Hala ere, Britainia Handiak mugari eta Irlandako iparraldeari emandako tratu arduragabeak bultzada berri bat eman dio Irlandako batasunari buruzko eztabaidari. 

Irakurri artikulu osoa Gure Esku - Periskopioan.

Después del Brexit: Irlanda, Escocia y la UE

Cuando Gran Bretaña abandonó formalmente la Unión Europea (UE) el 31 de enero de 2020, sus partidarios lo celebraron como una restauración de la «soberanía británica», pero el Brexit ha dado un nuevo impulso a la desintegración del Estado británico, con el aumento del apoyo a la independencia de Escocia y a la unidad de Irlanda. La UE, aunque en general simpatiza con estas aspiraciones, ha permanecido en gran medida pasiva debido a su instintiva aversión a la ruptura política. Es posible que esta postura tenga que cambiar.

La frontera irlandesa ha causado graves dificultades tanto durante las negociaciones del Brexit como desde entonces. Una nueva frontera porosa de la UE en una zona post-conflicto, amenazaba el mercado único y la unión aduanera de la UE y exigía soluciones imaginativas. La respuesta final, el «Protocolo sobre Irlanda/Irlanda del Norte» del Acuerdo de Retirada del Brexit, negoció un escenario recogiendo «lo mejor de ambos mundos»: proteger el Mercado Único, la economía regional, la jurisdicción británica y los derechos establecidos en el Acuerdo de Viernes Santo de 1998.

Sin embargo, el imprudente trato de Gran Bretaña a la frontera y al Norte de Irlanda ha dado un nuevo impulso al debate sobre la unidad irlandesa.

Lea el artículo completo en Gure Esku - Periskopioa.

After Brexit: Ireland, Scotland and the EU

When Britain formally left the European Union (EU) on January 31, 2020, its supporters celebrated it as a restoration of “British sovereignty”, but Brexit has given fresh impetus to the disintegration of the British state, with support for Scottish independence and Irish unity rising. The EU, while generally sympathetic to these aspirations, has remained largely passive due to its instinctive dislike of political rupture. This stance may need to change.

The Irish border has caused serious difficulties both during Brexit negotiations and since. A porous new EU frontier in a post-conflict zone, it threatened the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union and demanded imaginative solutions. The eventual answer, the “Protocol on Ireland/ Northern Ireland” to the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, negotiated a “best of both worlds” scenario: protecting the Single Market, the regional economy, British jurisdiction, and rights set out in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

However, Britain’s reckless treatment of the border and the North of Ireland has breathed fresh life into the Irish unity debate. 

Read the full article at Gure Esku - Periskopioa.

How will the EU regulate the tech giants?

The European Union is currently negotiating several pieces of legislation to regulate the digital economy, to improve the EU’s digital sovereignty and make it “fit for the digital decade”. This new digital strategy brings the EU directly into conflict with the so-called “tech giants” – companies like Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Facebook, and Microsoft that don’t pay their share of taxes, stifle competition, steal media content and undermine democracy.

The struggle against the dominance of the tech giants is not a new one – the EU's General Court in Luxembourg recently upheld a 2017 antitrust ruling against Google (Alphabet), fining it 2.4 billion euros for using its search engines to promote its own comparison-shopping ads, at rivals’ expense. In Italy, regulators have fined Amazon 1.1 billion euros for abusing its dominance to favour its own logistics service. Nonetheless, such responses are exceptions to the rule of the large online platforms.

How will EU grapple with the difficult task of regulating the tech giants, what is at stake, and what are the potential pitfalls? Is EU-regulation of the field even preferable to the current “law of jungle”? EU-journalist Staffan Dahllöf and Die Linke’s Nora Friese-Wendenburg – who is working on the digital package in the European Parliament – addressed these and other issues during a December 9 debate on the European Commission's new package of laws on digital regulation.

Read the full article and view a video of the presentation at Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung - Brussels Office.   

Brexit vil plage Europa, indtil Irland er genforenet

Brexit vil fortsætte med at plage Europa, så længe der er en britisk grænse gennem Irland. Danmark og EU skal støtte opfordringen til folkeafstemning om forening af Irland for at løse problemet.

Med brexit blev den britiske grænse mellem Irland og det nordlige Irland forvandlet til en ydre grænse for EU’s indre marked og toldunionen. Det skabte en række nye problemer, der ikke kan løses, imens grænsen eksisterer.

Den irske grænse løber 500 kilometer tværs gennem boliger, bygninger, kirkegårde og marker. Der er mere end 300 grænseovergange, men kun 11 ligger ved egentlige hovedveje. 

Læs mere: https://jyllands-posten.dk/debat/breve/ECE13582329/brexit-vil-plage-europa-indtil-irland-er-genforenet/

 

Countering the neoliberal privatisation of services

Will the COVID-19 pandemic drive further privatisation of the services sector and a new wave of austerity, or can we expect a departure from neoliberal orthodoxy, towards re-municipalisation and increased public investments? These were just some of the questions posed in an online debate with Dr Dieter Plehwe and Dr Mirjam Katzin on 11 November.

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the injustice and inefficiency of the privatising, outsourcing and commodifying of vital public services. It has also exposed the inadequacy of the current system in dealing with the mass job losses from national lockdowns, magnifying levels of inequality already worsened by several decades of austerity. However, there has also been growth in awareness of the importance of such services in times of crisis, underlining the need for strong, public, services.

Read the full article at Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung - Brussels Office. 

Climate Neutrality and Democratic Ownership after COVID

On 21 October, the Copenhagen-based Democracy in Europe Organisation (DEO), along with the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Brussels Office, hosted a forum on the challenges of a socially just transition to clean energy, with former Copenhagen City councillor Ulrik Kohl. Kohl, a researcher on community energy in the Nordic countries and Southeast Europe with Malmö University and Roskilde University, spoke about the role of the left and communities in organising grassroots, working class alternatives to the capitalist Green Deal.

The idea of a ‘Green Deal’, or ‘Green New Deal’, has increasingly been seen as a panacea for the unfolding climate crisis. Since the outbreak of the Covid-19, it has also been presented as a solution to the global health and economic crises unfolding in the wake of the pandemic. In Europe, the call for an ‘EU Green Deal’ emerged in 2019, centring around a target of European Union carbon neutrality by 2050. This year EU leaders made this a binding target, setting a further preliminary greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of at least 55% by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels).

Such a rapid transition to green energy and climate neutrality is an urgent necessity, but while welcome, the promised reductions have also been criticised as inadequate. Worse yet, they are unlikely to be met. The reliance on market mechanisms and emissions trading has proved worse than useless, cuts foreshadowed in 2015’s Paris Agreement have simply not eventuated, and without a major change in approach, the latest pledges by world governments at the COP26 summit in Glasgow are likely to go the same way.

Read the full article at Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung - Brussels Office.